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TORT LIABILITY AND RECREATIONAL
USE OF LAND*
INTRODUCTION
T he American public is increasingly turning to outdoor activi-
ties for recreation and relaxation.' Demand for unspoiled pub-
licly-owned parks and forest preserves may soon surpass the present
supply, resulting in a need to use more private lands for public
enjoyment.2 The unresolved issue of tort liability for injuries sus-
tained on a landowner's property, however, is an impediment to
the availability of these private areas. In general, tort liability of
0 The research for this article was undertaken as part of the Sea Grant Law Program
of the Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York at Buffalo, spon-
sored by the New York Sea Grant Institute under a grant from the Office of Sea Grant,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), U.S. Department of Com-
merce. The U.S. Government and the New York Sea Grant Institute are authorized to
produce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright
notation appearing hereon.
1. See Leisure: Where No Recission Is in Sight, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 15,
1979, at 41-43. This has included the evolution of new sports. For example, "hang-gliding"
involves jumping off cliffs and coasting through the air with an apparatus resembling a
plane with a parachute. See, Schwartz, How to Make a Million Doing Your Own Thing,
FORTUNE, June 4, 1979 at 138-40. "Orienteering" involves cross-country running, jogging,
and obstacle course running under timed conditions similar to sports-car rallying. See,
Ford, Orienteering, 6 BLAIR & KETCHUM's COUNTRY J. 42, 45 (June 1978); Heath, Sports:
A Growing Sport Afoot, SIGNATURE, (Jan. 1980) at 11.
2. See C. JENSEN, OUTDOOR RECREATION IN AMEICA: TRENDS, PROBLEMS, AND OPPOR-
TUNITIMS 161-63, 175-94 (3rd ed. 1977); L. REm, OtrDooR RECREATION PREFERENCES: A
NATIONWIDE STUDY OF USER DEsIREs 3-5 (1966); Reis, Policy and Planning for Recreational
Use of Inland Waters, 40 TEMP. L. Q. 155 (1967); Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal
Union, 10 BUFFALO L. REv. 427 (1961); Walte, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a
Suggested Solution, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 542.
Certain land use laws have implicitly recognized the increasing demand for recreational
land and have expressly recognized the need to preserve open spaces. See, e.g., N.Y. ENvm.
CONsERv. LAW § 24-0105 (6) (McKinney 1978); N.Y. ExEc. LAWv § 805 (McKinney 1978);
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1979). See also COLO. REv. STAT.
§§ 31-42-101 to 111 (Supp. 1979) (land acquisitions for recreational trails).
3. See Barrett, Good Sports and Bad Lands: The Application of Washington's Recrea-
tional Use Statute Limiting Landowner Liability, 53 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1977); Note, Liability
of Landowners to Persons Entering for Recreational Purppses, 1964 Wis. L. R.Ev. 705; Note,
The Minnesota Recreational Use Statute: A Preliminary Analysis, 3 Wm. MrrcHEua L. REv.
117 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Analysis]. See also BECKWITH, Developments in
the Law of Historic Preservation and a Reflection on Liberty, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 93
(1976); Hustace, Free Outdoor Recreational Areas for Missouri-A Law Limiting Land-
owners' Liability, 25 J. Mo. B. 423 (1969); Comment, The Status of Visitors in the National
Parks Located in Wyoming-Federal Liability Under Current Applicable Wyoming Law,
2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 447 (1967); Backyard Liabilities, BUSINESS WEEK, July 10, 1978,
at 102-04.
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landowners may arise even when the injured plaintiff fails to ad-
here to an ordinary standard of care, is unfamiliar with the ter-
rain, or engages in an inherently dangerous activity.4
To secure public access to private lands, many state legisla-
tures have enacted statutes to provide landowners with immunity
from tort liability5 in a variety of situations. Now commonly
known as "recreational use statutes," Michigan was the first state
to enact such legislation in 1953.6 New York soon followed with a
limited-immunity law of this type in 1956,7 and New Jersey passed
comparable legislation in 1962.8 Statutes patterned after the Michi-
4. A fear of tort liability by landowners motivated New York to adopt a landowner
liability limitation statute in 1956. "As long as landowners feel there is a question of
personal liability if persons to whom they give permission are injured, some of them may
refuse permission and post their lands. This bill is to make clear that there is no such
liability." JOINT LEGIS. COMM., REPORT ON REVISION OF THE CONSERVATION LAW, 1956 N.Y.
LEGis. Doc. No. 11, at 23.
5. No new duty or ground of liability is created by the statutes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 35-5-4 15.4 (1975); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103 (McKinney Supp. 1979). See also JOINT
LEGIS. COMM., MEMORANDUM ON REVISION OF THE CONSERVATION LAW, reprinted in 1956
N.Y. LAws 1943-44.
6. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 300.201 (1953). This statute provides:
No cause of action shall arise for injuries to any person who is on the lands of
another without paying to such other a valuable consideration for the purpose
of fishing, hunting or trapping, with or without permission, against the owner,
tenant or lessee of said premises unless the injuries were caused by the gross
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner, tenant or lessee.
Id. The statute formed the basis of a model act drafted in 1963 by the Council on State
Governments. That model was eventually adopted in similar form by forty-two states.
See Barrett, supra note 3, at 3-4 (citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, XXIV SUGGESTED
STATE LEGISLATION, 150-52 (1965)).
There have been no successful challenges to the constitutionality of the recreational
use statutes. In Thomas v. Consumers Power Co., 58 Mich. App. 486, 228 N.W.2d 786
(1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 394 Mich. 459, 231 N.W.2d 653 (1975), a Michigan
court determined that there was a legitimate state interest in promoting tourism and
opening lands for recreational use by the public, and that the statute for achieving this
end was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
in Goodson v. City of Racine, 61 Wis.2d 554, 213 N.W.2d 16 (1973), labelled an equal
protection clause challenge as "frivolous", stating that "[t]here is no basis upon which to
argue-in light of the legislative intent to open up private property for recreational pur-
poses-that the legislative classification in limiting the applicability [of the statute] is
arbitrary or unreasonable." Id. at 561, 213 N.W.2d at 20. See also Lostritto v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977); Heider v. Michigan
Sugar Co., 375 Mich. 490, 134 N.W.2d 637 (1965).
7. N.Y. CONSERV. LA-W § 370 (McKinney 1956) (current version at N.Y. GEN. OBLIG,
LAw § 9-103 (McKinney Supp. 1979)). Legislative history reveals that both state and
private organizations lobbied in support of the law. See, e.g., JOINT LEGis. Comm., REPORT
ON REVISION OF THE CONSERVATION LAw, 1956 N.Y. LEGiS. Doc. No. 11, at 26.
8. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42A-1 (West Supp. 1979). The 1962 provision covered only
owners of woodlands and agricultural lands. The original measure was repealed in 1968
and a broader measure was substituted for it. 1968 N.J. Laws ch. 73, § 4.
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gan prototype fit within a common framework and generally ab-
solve the landowner from the duty to keep his premises safe for
entry.9 Additionally, the owner is not required to warn the en-
trant of dangerous conditions existing on the property. Two ex-
ceptions qualify this general grant of immunity, and render the
immunity under the recreational use statutes "limited" or "partial."
If a landowner receives consideration from the entrant as a condi-
tion for using the land, or if he wilfully or wantonly fails to guard
or warn against a dangerous use, condition, structure or activity
on the property, the landowner will not be protected by the statute.
Defining the contours of these two exceptions has generated much
litigation. The following discussion examines, and to some extent
chronicles, judicial interpretations of landowner immunity within
recreational use statutes.
Until recently, the common law liability of an owner or occu-
pier of land was governed exclusively by the "status" of the en-
trant.10 The common law categories of trespasser, licensee and
invitee defined the extent of the duty owed by the landlord to the
entrant. 1 The categories, however, were not entirely dispositive
9. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-i5-4 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1101 to 1107 (1977);
CAL. Cirv. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 33-41-101 to -105 (Supp.
1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-557g to 557j (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7,
§§ 5901-5907 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 375.251 (West 1974 & Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 105-403 to 409 (1968); HAwMI R v. STAT. §§ 520-1 to 8 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 36-1604
(1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 31-37 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-
2-6-3 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 111C.1 to .7 (West Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 58-3201 to 3207 (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. § 150.645 (Supp. 1979); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2795 (West Supp. 1978); ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3001 to 3005 (1974); MD. NAT.
Rys. CODE ANN. §§ 5-1101 to 1108 (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 17C (West
1973); MIcH. Comr. LAws ANN. § 300.201 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 87.01 to .03
(West 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 89-2-1 to 89-2-7 (Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 67-808 to 809 (1970); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 37-1001 to 1008 (1974); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 41.510 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 212.34 (Supp. 1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42A-2
to 5 (West Supp. 1979-80); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-4-5.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. GEN. OBLG.
LAw § 9-103 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 113-120.5 to -120.7 (1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01 to -06 (1974); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.18 to .181 (Page
1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, §§ 10-15 (West 1976); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 105.655 to .680
(1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477- to 7 (Purdon Supp. 1979); S.D. CoMP. LAWs ANN.
§ 20-9-5 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1301 to 1303 (1973); TEX. REv. Crv. STAT.
ANN. art. lb (Vernon 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-14-1 to 57-14-7 (Supp. 1979); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5212 (1973); VA. CODE § 8.01-654.2 (Supp. 1976); WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 4.24.200 to .210 (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 29.68 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 34-389.1 to .6 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
10. See IV. PRossER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 57-61 (4th ed. 1971).
11. In this tripartite hierarchy, the "invitee" generally enjoys the greatest protection.
An "invitee" includes, among others, those who enter the premises with a business pur-
pose in mind. Id. § 61, at 385-87. The landowner does not insure the safety of invitees,
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in any given case. For example, courts carved out exceptions to the
category of trespasser in an effort to prevent harsh results in cases
involving children. The "attractive nuisance" doctrine, 2 created
to protect small children from dangerous conditions and the pos-
sibility of physical harm, was one such exception.
Distinguishing among the entrant categories proved trouble-
some for the courts. In Rowland v. Christian,'3 the California Su-
preme Court discarded the common law distinctions and held that
a landowner owes any entrant a general duty of "reasonable care
under the circumstances." 14 The test of liability developed under
this new formulation is "whether in the management of his prop-
erty, [the owner] has acted as a reasonable man in view of the
probability of injury to others."'" Other jurisdictions have adopted
this approach in order to avoid usurpation of the jury's function
and the application of mechanical standards that may be arbitrary
or unfair.' 6 Six jurisdictions have partially adopted the Rowland
standard, eliminating the licensee and invitee labels while retain-
ing the trespasser category.'1
but he does have a major burden of responsibility for their well-being. An invitee is
entitled to enter upon the land with the expectation that the area has been made safe
for his ordinary use and enjoyment. Id. § 61, at 388-89.
A less onerous duty is owed to a "licensee", defined as "any person who is privileged
to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent." RSTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 330 (1965). An owner or occupier becomes liable for injuries to a licensee
when the owner: (1) knew of a hazardous condition on the land, (2) could reasonably
have expected that the licensee would not perceive the risk, and (3) failed to avert the
harm or warn of its risk. See W. PROssER, supra note 10, § 60, at 380-82.
"Trespassers," those persons "who [enter] or [remain] upon land in the possession of
another without a privilege to do so", RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 329 (1965), are
the least protected of the three entrant classes. No duty is owed to a trespasser beyond
that of refraining from inflicting willful or deliberate injuries. See W. PRossEit, supra note
10, § 58, at 357-58. Thus a landowner could be liable for setting "traps" or "pitfalls" into
which a trespasser might stumble. See, e.g., Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971).
12. See text accompanying note 109 infra.
13. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
14. Id. at 116, 443 P.2d at 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
15. Id. at 119,443 P.2d at 568,70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
16. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Smith
v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973);
Webb v. City & Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977); Mile High Fence Co. v.
Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51
Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Louisville Trust Co. v. Nutting, 437 S.A,.2d 484 (Ky. 1968)
(dictum); Ouelette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d (1976); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d
233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976); Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I.
294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975).
17. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973); Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d
846 (Me. 1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Peterson v.
Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D.
1977); Antoniewicz v. Resczynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
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Despite increasing acceptance of the California approach to
landowner liability, a majority of states still use the three common
law categories as a basis for defining the scope of the duty owed
to an entrant.18 The emergence and move toward the Rowland
standard, however, is indicative of greater judicial concern for an
entrant's safety. It also suggests that a sharing of the risks between
the entrant and occupier may be appropriate.1 9
Whether the abandonment of the common law categories has
any effect on the recreational use statutes was considered in two
cases: English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist.20 and Wight v. State of
New York.2' In English, a California appellate court interpreted
Rowland as not abrogating the landowner immunity granted by
the recreational use statute.2 The court noted that the California
statute predated Rowland, and therefore relied upon legislative in-
action after the decision to conclude that the statutory immunity
was still effective. It also recognized that the statute had been
amended after Rowland to increase the number of leisure activi-
ties it covered. New York's Court of Claims similarly upheld the
statutory immunity in Wight: "[a]lthough the judiciary has the
power to continually fix and amend common-law rules which have
18. See, e.g., McMullan v. Butler, 346 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 1977); Walton v. Norphlett,
56 Ill. App. 3d 4, 371 N.E.2d 978 (1977); Frazee v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 219 Kan.
661, 549 P.2d 561 (1976); Starns v. Lancaster, 553 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1977); Sherman v. Subur-
ban Trust Co., 282 Md. 288, 384 A.2d 76 (1978); Astleford v. Milner Enterprises, Inc., 233
So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1970); Caroff v. Liberty Lumber Co., 146 N.J. Super. 353, 369 A.2d 983
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); Sutherland v. St. Francis Hosp., 595 P.2d 780, 782 (Okla. 1979);
Loney v. McPhillips, 268 Or. 378, 521 P.2d 340 (1974); Crotty v. Reading Indus., Inc., 287
Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 345 A.2d 259 (1975); Behrns v. Burke, 89 S.D. 96, 229 N.W.2d 86 (1975).
19. See Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1978), where the
court stated that a "landowner must act as a reasonable man in maintaining his property
in a reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances, including the likelihood
of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk."
Id. at 100 (footnote omitted). This analysis parallels the balancing of "burden" versus
"benefits" test expressed in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947). Under this approach, certain aggregate risks, such as a low probability of substantial
harm or a higher degree of certainty of minor injury, do not require preventive measures
by the landowner if it is economically inefficient to do so. See id. at 173. See generally
R. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.2 (2d ed. 1977).
20. 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1977). Accord, Phillips v. United States,
590 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1979); Parish v. Lloyd, 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431
(1978); Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905
(1977).
21. 93 Misc. 2d 560,403 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
22. 66 Cal. App. 3d at 731, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 228. California's statute has a unique
provision denying immunity when the visitors are expressly invited rather than merely
permitted to enter the premises. CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (c) (West 1975). This provision has
been narrowly construed. See Phillips v. United States, 590 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1979).
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their roots in the judicial process, it is axiomatic that this power
is abruptly limited, and cut off, in those areas where the Legisla-
ture has seen fit to codify a common law rule."2'
The statutory immunity per se has not been repudiated by
any court that has considered its applicability. Although courts
have held the immunity to be unavailable to certain landowners,
they have treated this as an exception to the statute, rather than
as an invalidation of it. These cases are consistent with the general
notion that a court may not override a legitimate legislative pur-
pose: in this instance, the exemption of a certain class of land-
owners from tort liability.
24
When a case of this type is before a court, the first step in the
analysis is to ascertain whether the plaintiff's activity is covered
by the statute.25 If so, the next step is to decide whether the statute
protects the landowner from liability or whether there are any
applicable exceptions to the statutory immunity. 6
I. APPLICABILITY OF THE RECREATIONAL USE STATUTES
A. Geographic Scope
Recreational use statutes seldom contain language limiting
the geographic scope of landowner immunity. The states that do
place geographic limits on statutory immunity, however, differ re-
23. 93 Misc. 2d at 564,403 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
24. One commentator suggests limiting tort immunity to instances where the only
reason underlying permission to enter was the promise of tort immunity. Preliminary
Analysis, supra note 3, at 152 & n. 120. Although a novel attempt to elicit the recreational
benefit while curtailing the tort immunity "cost," this suggestion appears to be unworkable.
Many owners do not come into direct contact with recreational visitors on their land, es.
pecially where landholdings may be extensive. In addition, permission to enter is usually
implied by acquiescence. This is recognized by those statutes that make "posting" irrele-
vant. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42A-2 (West Supp. 1979-80); N.Y. GEN. ODLUG. LAw
§ 9-103 (McKinney Supp. 1979). Logically, if owners succeeded in deterring every visitor
from entering, there could be no tort liability. See, e.g., Thone v. Nicholson, 84 Mich. App.
538, 553, 269 N.W.2d 665, 672 (1978) (suggesting that a proliferation of "no trespassing"
signs is an alternative to statutory immunity).
25. While statutes generally itemize the covered recrational activities, some contain
omnibus clauses encompassing "any other outdoor sport, game and recreational activity
including practice and instruction in any thereof." See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42A-2
(West Supp. 1979).
26. A landowner need not curtail his use of the property, and may impose limita-
tions on access to the land without forfeiting the immunity. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-
14-4 (Supp. 1979). But see MIss. CODE ANN. § 89-2-7 (Supp. 1979) (conditioning immunity
on newspaper publication of availability of land).
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garding the territory to be excluded by the limitation. For ex-
ample, Vermont and Illinois restrict immunity to areas beyond
city limits,2 7 and other states grant immunity only to rural land-
owners.2 8 Each state court additionally defines the scope of the
geographic limitation according to the language of the statute,
legislative intent and public policy.
Illustrative of the interpretation of geographic scope is the
Oregon legislature's expansion of immunity to owners of "agricul-
tural land, range land, forest land, and lands adjacent to or con-
tiguous to the ocean shore."-29 This statute, however, has been
interpreted narrowly. In Tijerina v. Cornelius Christian Church,"
the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that a softball diamond on a
3 V2 acre plot of church property was not "agricultural land" within
the meaning of the recreational use statute, even though the land
produced "vegetation normally grown for agricultural purposes
[and was] suitable for commercial farming."31 The court determ-
ined the legislature's intent was only to extend the immunity to
"landholdings which tended to have recreational value but not be
susceptible to adequate policing or correction of dangerous condi-
tions. 3 2 Prior to Tijerina, the Oregon courts had taken a more
expansive view of the recreational use statute;33 the case apparently
signalled an end to the broad interpretaton.3 4
In Herring v. Hauck,35 the Georgia Court of Appeals de-
cided that the recreational use statute did not "apply to the friendly
neighbor who permits his friends and neighbors to use his swim-
ming pool without charge." 6 New Jersey adopted a similar policy
27. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5212 (a) (1) (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 70, § 32 (a) (Smith-
Hurd 1978).
28. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-41-101 (1973); SD. CoMr'. LAws ANN. § 20-9-5
(Supp. 1977).
29. OR. REV. STAT. § 105.655 (2) (1978). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42A-3 (West
Supp. 1979-80), which substituted the expansive term "premises" for the restrictive term
"agricultural lands or woodlands." See also WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210 (Supp. 1976).
80. 273 Or. 58,589 P.2d 634 (1975).
31. Id. at 64, 589 P.2d at 637.
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Loney v. McPhillips, 268 Or. 878, 521 P.2d 340 (1974); Bilbao v. Pacific
Power & Light Co., 257 Or. 360, 479 P.2d 226 (1971).
34. Recently, in Reynolds v. Port of Portland, 31 Or. App. 817, 571 P.2d 917 (1977),
summary judgment for the landowner was reversed because he had not alleged the "agri-
cultural, range or forest" character of the land in his pleadings. Id. at 819, 571 P.2d at 919.
35. 118 Ga. App. 623, 165 S.E.2d 198 (1968).
36. Id. at 624, 165 S.E.2d at 199.
1979]
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in Boileau v. De Cecco,37 declaring: "[w]e cannot presume a grant
of tort immunity to the owners of thousands of swimming pools in
residential areas .... [The statute does not extend] to homeowners
in suburbia."38
The interpretation of the geographic scope of the New Jersey
recreational use statute presents a particularly interesting case-
study. In Scheck v. Houdaille Construction Materials,0 the court
attempted to refine the rural-urban distinction. The court ex-
tended immunity on the basis of foreseeability: "Where it would
be unreasonable to expect that a landowner would be able to de-
tect interlopers on anything but a sporadic basis, ' 40 the immunity
would be available.
Later decisions further eliminated some of the restrictions
suggested by Boileau. For example, in Odar v. Chase Manhattan
Bank,41 immunity was extended to "nonresidential, rural or semi-
rural lands whereon the enumerated sports and recreational ac-
tivities are conducted. '42 An intermediate appellate court in
Harrison v. Middlesex Water Co.43 attempted to reconcile the in-
consistencies of the New Jersey precedents by explaining that "in
Odar it was not intended to limit the statutory immunity to un-
developed property lying in 'rural or semi-rural' zones." 44 The
Harrison interpretation focused on "true outdoor" recreational
use, regardless of whether the land was in a residential or rural
community.45 The same court, in Primo v. City of Bridgeton,
4
37. 125 N.J. Super. 263, 310 A.2d 497 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 65 N.J. 234,
323 A.2d 449 (1974). The court considered the New Jersey landowner statute's reference to
another statute, which required an owner to post "no trespassing" signs "if he wishes to
have the sanction of the law behind him to prosecute hunters and fishermen who trespass
upon his land," to be significant. 125 NJ. Super. at 267, 310 A.2d at 499. The court de-
duced that the statutory cross reference limited the recreational statute to "rural or semi-
rural tracts." Id. The "no trespassing" statutes define what a landowner must do to have
authorities prosecute trespassers. New Jersey's recreational use statute is identical to that of
New York, which grants immunity regardless of posting. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42A-2 (West
Supp. 1979); N.Y. GEN. OBLsG. LAW § 9-103 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
38. 125 N.J. Super. at 266-67, 310 A.2d at 499-500.
39. 121 N.J. Super. 335, 297 A.2d 17 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
40. Id. at 343, 297 A.2d at 21.
41. 138 NJ. Super. 464, 351 A.2d 389 (Super. Ct. App. Div.) cerlij. denied, 70 N.J.
525, 361 A.2d 540 (1976).
42. 138 N.J. Super. at 468, 351 A.2d at 391.
43. 158 N.J. Super. 368, 386 A.2d 405 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978), rev'd, 80 N.J. 391,
403 A.2d 910 (1979).
44. Id. at 380, 386 A.2d at 411.
45. Id. at 382, 386 A.2d at 412.
46. 162 N.J. Super. 394, 392 A.2d 1252 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
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held that an injury on a playground slide in a municipal park was
not covered by the statute. The court developed a test for statutory
immunity based on whether the land was improved and whether
the condition of the land was natural or artificial. If the land was
unimproved, the statute presumptively applied.4 7 If the land was
improved, the immunity would generally be available if the "ar-
tificial" instrumentality had a "rational connection with either the
premises or the activity."48 The playground slide met the improved
"rational connection" test, but did not fulfill the "true outdoors"
requirement as suggested by Harrison.
In an attempt to provide broad coverage under the New Jersey
recreational use statute, the court in Diodato v. Camden County
Park Comm'n49 made it clear that the grant of immunity should
not depend on a restrictive classification of the land. It suggested
that the statute "should be given [its] broadest interpretation to
include all lands bearing a resemblance to the 'true outdoors' and,
more importantly, which are susceptible to use for the recreational
activities enumerated in the statute." 50
Talaksen v. Ross,51 a recent New Jersey decision, further criti-
cized the simple residential/non-residential dichotomy that was
suggested by Boileau and Odar. The court extended the protec-
tion of the landowner statute to the owner of a seventy-acre tract
of undeveloped land that was zoned residential and was closely
located to developed residential areas. An infant plaintiff, who had
been playing on defendant's land, slipped and fell on ice that had
formed there. Even though the source of the freezing waters had
been artificial (easements for drainage), the court expressed will-
ingness to grant immunity where the use was normal and reason-
able, provided that no hazardous condition existed.2
In 1979, the lower court decision in Harrison v. Middlesex
Water Co. was reversed.5 The New Jersey Supreme Court limited
tort immunity, but did not repudiate the distinctions between im-
47. Id. at 402, 392 A.2d at 1256.
48. Id.
49. 162 NJ. Super. 275, 892 A.2d 665 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
50. Id. at 286, 892 A.2d at 670. Although immunity was denied, it was only because
the injury resulted when the plaintiff struck a submerged trash barrel. Id. at 287, 892
A.2d at 671.
51. 167 N.J. Super. 1,400 A.2d 485 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979).
52. Id. at 4,400 A.2d at 486.
53. 80 N.J. 391, 408 A.2d 910 (1979).
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proved and unimproved land previously articulated in Diodato.
Instead, Harrison focused on a variant of the rural-urban test:
"[d]ecisions which totally disregard the use for which the land is
zoned, the nature of the community in which it is located, its rela-
tive isolation from densely populated neighborhoods, as well as its
general accessibility to the public at large, take too expansive a
view of the immunity."' The court stated that immunity should
not extend to "improved lands freely used by the general public
located in populated neighborhoods in urban or suburban areas."'
Immunity would be available, however, for "lands located in rural
or woodland reaches where the activities of people thereon cannot
be supervised or controlled and where the burden of guarding
against intermittent trespassers may far outweigh any risk to such
persons and the presence of such persons may be difficult to forsee
and contain."56
Understandably, other jurisdictions have not attempted to
imply restrictive geographic terms into the statutes as the conflict-
ing tort immunity decisions in New Jersey illustrate the futility
of such restrictions. The New Jersey decisions involve judicial
usurpation of an essentially legislative function, especially in light
of an express legislative intent to broaden the immunity beyond
"agricultural lands and farmlands."5 7 A better approach than im-
plying geographic restrictions would be to carefully apply the ex-
ceptions contained in the statute.
B. The Consideration Exception
In most instances, immunity will not be conferred upon own-
ers and occupiers58 of land when "consideration" has been received
54. Id. at 401,403 A.2d at 915.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 402, 403 A.2d at 915.
57. See legislative history of New Jersey statute, supra note 29.
58. The immunity extends as well to those persons having merely a partial or tem-
porary possessory interest in the land. See, e.g., Thomas v. Consumers Power Co., 58 Mich.
App. 486, 228 N.W.2d 786, rev'd in part, 394 Mich. 459, 231 N.W.2d 653 (1975) (easement
holder); Denton v. L.W. Vail Co., Inc., 23 Or. App. 28, 541 P.2d 511 (1975) (government
contractor occupying premises to build a road). Where, however, a landowner previously
owned the land, but lost it through an easement by prescription, a liability suit against
that defendant will be dismissed because "[i]t is inequitable to impose a duty of main-
tenance on one without authority to control use." Jones v. Halekulani Hotel, Inc., 557 F.2d
1308, 1311 (9th Cir. 1977). Contra, Darr v. Lone Star Industries, 94 Cal. App. 3d 895, 157




by the landowner.5 If an entrant pays for the privilege of enter-
ing the land for recreational purposes,60 traditional negligence
standards will govern. The landowner's liability will either be de-
termined under the common law entrant categories,"1 or by the
Rowland v. Christian62 standard of "reasonable care under the
circumstances."63
Whenever a monetary fee is a condition for entrance onto the
land, the statutory immunity is not applicable, and should be de-
nied. The statutory purpose to encourage gratuitous access to pri-
vate lands makes it inconsistent to allow a landowner to collect
money for entrance to the land and still claim statutory immunity
from tort actions. 4 It is, however, inevitable that problems will
arise regarding who required and who received payment. For ex-
ample, in Thompson v. United States, 6 5 the Sportsmen's Associa-
tion sponsored a motorcycle race on federal lands. The Associa-
tion paid application and rental fees and passed the cost on to the
participants, including the plaintiff, in the form of entry fees. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the considera-
tion received by the landowner, although indirect, was sufficient to
invoke the statutory exception to immunity.66
Similarly, consideration for use of the land may be implied
59. See, e.g., Kesner v. Trenton, 216 S.E.2d 880 (W. Va. 1975); Copeland v. Larson,
46 Wis. 2d 337, 174 N.W.2d 745 (1970).
60. At times, it may be difficult to ascertain if a plaintiff's activity is in fact recrea-
tional. See, e.g., Gerkin v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist., 95 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 612 (1979). If the plaintiff does enter the premises for a recreational purpose, the
landowner is entitled to immunity even if the visitor pursues some non-enumerated recre-
ational activity. Smith v. Scrap Disposal Corp., 96 Cal. App. 3d 525, 158 Cal. Rptr. 134
(1979).
61. See text accompanying notes 10-12, supra.
62. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
63. Id.
64. One commentator, arguing the cause of historic preservationism, has urged a
narrow interpretation of the consideration exception:
[a] literal application of these statutes would penalize those landowners who make
land available to the public whose profit-making enterprises are on the premises
but are totally unrelated to the public. Suppose the owner of a historic plantation
opens his famous orchards, gardens, and lakes to the public free of charge. Does
the statute require the owner to shut down his farming operations while the visitors
are on the premises in order to gain the advantage of the lower standard of care?
Beckwith, supra note 3, at 126.
65. 592 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1979).
66. Id. at 1108. Similar situations include commercial enterprises offering "free" access
to recreational areas adjacent to its profit-seeking ventures. Several state court opinions
have held that in such instances, the indirect benefits received by the landowner precludes
him from asserting statutory immunity.
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and immunity denied. In Copeland v. Larson,7 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court denied immunity to a coastal resort owner who al-
lowed free access to a marina and beach area adjacent to his general
store and fast-food restaurant. Although there was no charge for the
use of the dock or swimming area, consideration was implied be-
cause many users of the harbor and beach had found it convenient
to buy food or snacks from the general store or restaurant. Based on
this implication, the high court rejected the landowner's defense
of recreational immunity when he was sued by a sixteen-year-old
boy, who had sustained serious injuries after diving off the dock.
The court held that it would be inappropriate to extend such
immunity to a landowner who had profited from the recreational
use of his land.68 Observing that on prior occasions the plaintiff
had purchased food and other items from the defendant's store,
the court said that even "anticipated revenues" would be suffi-
cient to trigger the consideration exception:
[t]he benefit the defendants expected to receive from increased
sales in their store by creating prospective customers through per-
mitting the use of their swimming facilities and the mutuality of
interest of the swimmers and the defendant was sufficient "valuable
consideration" for the general and implied permission to the
public to use the bathing facilities.69
The thrust of Copeland is that the landowner immunity statute
does not extend to commercial defendants if they provided access
to recreational facilities with a business motivation. This line of
reasoning is consistent with the legislative intent to grant im-
munity only to those owners who open their lands primarily for
recreation rather than profit.
West Virginia endorsed the "anticipated revenues" test in
Kesner v. Trenton.70 In Kesner, two children drowned while swim-
67. 46 Wis. 2d 337, 174 N.W.2d 745 (1970).
68. Id. at 339, 174 N.W.2d at 747. The court further found that any visitor or patron
of the resort facility, whether they had actually purchased anything from the adjacent
store, would be entitled to have the premises made safe for entry. Id. at 340, 174 N.W.2d
at 748.
69. Id. at 344, 174 N.W.2d at 751.
70. 216 S.E.2d 880 (W. Va. 1975). The court stated that "charge" is equivalent to
"consideration." Id. at 885. The West Virginia statute, W. VA. CODE § 19-25-4 (1977), is
virtually identical to its Wisconsin counterpart. Both provide two exceptions for immu-
nity: economic benefit and wilful or wanton misconduct. Cf. ALA. CODE § 35-15-4 (1975)
(an exception for "commercial enterprise for profit'). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 3341-
104 (d), which excludes immunity "for injury received on land incidental to the use of
land on which a commercial or business enterprise of any description is being carried on."
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ming at a free beach in the defendant's commercial marina, and
their parents sued for negligence. Citing Copeland, the court de-
nied immunity to the defendants under the West Virginia statute
since they "reasonably could have expected to attract prospective
customers and thus, to increase sales and rentals at the marina by
allowing people to swim in the lake at no cost."
71
Few courts have been willing to completely accept the "antici-
pated revenues" test as used in Copeland and Kesner. When the
economic benefits received by the owner are less direct than sales
from an adjacent business, courts have been reluctant to find the
"consideration" necessary for the application of the statutory im-
munity exception. For instance, in Bourn v. Herring,7 2 a fourteen-
year-old boy drowned at a Sunday school picnic. The defendant,
a commercial dairy enterprise, opened up its facilities to the pic-
nickers without charge. The plaintiff alleged that the commercial
enterprise invited the group to the picnic grounds "for advertising
purposes and to promote the sale of the defendant corporation's
products." 73 Although the court admitted that such a motive might
be proved, it allowed the immunity, finding that there had been
no consideration for the public use of the land.74 Although the
court recognized that the defendant might enjoy enhanced "good
will" and an improved reputation in the community, those bene-
fits were too indirect and insubstantial for the consideration excep-
tion to apply. Judicial reluctance to deny the tort immunity where
the potential economic benefit is speculative is understandable
based on the original legislative intent. 5
In addition to the differences regarding indirect economic
benefits, courts have also disagreed on the amount of considera-
tion necessary to defeat the statutory immunity. Smith v. United
States" held that the vehicle entry fee upon admission to Yellow-
71. 216 S.E.2d at 885.
72. 225 Ga. 67, 166 S.E.2d 89 (1969), af'g in part, rev'g in part Herring v. R. L.
Mathis Certified Dairy Co., 118 Ga. App. 132, 162 S.E.2d 863 (1968).
73. 225 Ga. at 67, 166 S.E.2d at 91.
74. Id. at 68, 166 S.E.2d at 92.
75. The Bourn principle was reaffirmed in Epps v. Chattahoochee Brick Co., 140 Ga.
App. 426, 231 S.E.2d 443 (1976), which did not apply the "consideration" exception to an
operator of a fishing lake where free swimming was permitted. Although the court recog-
nized that the defendant might enjoy enhanced "good will" and an improved reputation
in the community, those benefits were too indirect and insubstantial for the exception to
apply. See also Hamilton v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Va. 1974), which con-
sidered receipt of federal taxes as too indierct a benefit to constitute "consideration" and
defeat the defense of immunity. Id. at 234.
76. 383 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Wyo. 1974), afT'd, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976).
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stone National Park was not sufficient consideration to invoke the
exception in the Wyoming statute. An identical conclusion was
reached by the Georgia Supreme Court in Stone Mountain Me-
morial Ass'n v. Herrington.77 The Georgia court found that
"[t]he fee is strictly a parking fee for the automobile to enter
[since] [p]ersons on foot are not charged any fee."781 Similarly,
Diodato v. Camden County Park Comm'n79 did not consider pay-
ment of a "fee" to use a baseball field as a bar to tort immunity for
the landowner when the plaintiff left the baseball field and sus-
tained injuries upon diving into a nearby river.
These cases suggest that if nominal fees are collected to main-
tain the recreational premises or adjacent parking facilities rather
than to provide the owner or operator with a profit, then no eco-
nomic benefit in the Kesner or Copeland sense exists. Accordingly,
there is no reason to deny immunity.
However, the opposite approach has also been recognized by
various courts. For example, in Garfield v. United States,80 the
court determined that payment for a hunting permit was sufficient
consideration to deny tort immunity, even though the revenues
had been used for "protection, conservation and management of
fish and wildlife." 81 This conclusion conflicts with the implicit
purpose of the statutes and is difficult to reconcile with the "park-
ing fee" cases. In both situations, the monies collected were used
solely for public benefit. When no profit is derived and no busi-
ness or land speculation motives are present, the imposition of
liability appears contrary to the legislative goal of expanding recre-
ational opportunities.
8 2
77. 225 Ga. 746, 171 S.E2d 521, rev'g 119 Ga. App. 658, 168 S.E.2d 633 (Ct. App.
1969).
78. 225 Ga. at 747, 171 S.E.2d at 523.
79. 162 N.J. Super. 275, 392 A.2d 665 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). Immunity herc was
ultimately denied, although not on "consideration" grounds. See text accompanying notes
149-50 infra.
80. 297 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Wis. 1969).
81. Id. at 896-99.
82. The argument has less force if the owner who collects a "nominal fee" is a private
landowner, similar to the commercial defendants in Kesner and Copeland. No cases have
yet dealt with a private landowner receiving money which was used solely to facilitate
recreational use of land. If it could be dearly demonstrated that such money was not
being used to increase the value of land for possible resale, it would be appropriate to
allow the immunity. If the entry fee, however, was also used to increase the value of the
land, the owner should be denied the statutory immunity by a liberal interpretation of the
"consideration" exception, as suggested in Copeland and Kesner.
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C. The Gross Negligence or Wilful Misconduct Exception
In the absence of wilful or wanton misconduct by the land-
owner, or of special hazards inhering in the land, recreational use
statutes furnish a prima facie defense against injuries related to all
activities enumerated in the statute. 3 Many cases have denied re-
covery on this basis, holding that the diverse activities engaged in
were covered by the statute.
8 4
83. Since the immunity derives from access to land, the statutes afford no defense
whatsoever to liability theories unrelated to the land. See Thomas v. Consumers Power
Co., 58 Mich. App. 486, 491, 228 N.W.2d 786, 789, rev'd in part on other grounds, 394
Mich. 459, 231 N.W.2d 653 (1975) (product liability claim against snowmobile manufac-
turer unaffected by judgment releasing co-defendant landowner).
84. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 590 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1979) (mountain climb-
ing); Lovell v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. Co., 457 F.2d 1009 (6th Cir. 1972) (hiking); Mc-
Clain v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 770 (D. Ore. 1978) (recreational vehicle); Orawsky v.
Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 472 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (fishing and swimming);
Blair v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 217 (D. Nev. 1977) (swimming); Gard v. United States,
420 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 594 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100
S.Ct. 138 (1979) (spelunking); Hamilton v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Va. 1974)
(sightseeing); Smith v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Wyo. 1974), aft'd, 546 F.2d.
874 (10th Cir. 1976) (tourism); Durham v. City of Los Angeles, 91 Cal. App. 3d 567, 154
Cal. Rptr. 243 (1979) (hopping trains) (railroad trespass statute and recreational use
statute constructed similarly); Parish v. Lloyd, 82 Cal. App. 3d 785, 147 Cal. Rptr. 431
(1977) (motorcycle riding); Herring v. Hauck, 118 Ga. App. 623, 165 S.E.2d 198 (1968)
(diving); Johnson v. Stryker Corp., 70 Ill. App. 3d 717, 388 N.E2d 932 (1979) (diving);
Heider v. Michigan Sugar Co., 375 Mich. 490, 134 N.W.2d 637 (1965), cert. granted, 383
U.S. 905, cert. dismissed, 385 U.S. 362, reh. den., 385 U.S. 1043 (1966) (trapping muskrat);
State ex rel. Tucker v. District Court, 155 Mont. 202, 468 P.2d 773 (1970) (riding railway
tram car); Tallasken v. Ross, 167 N.J. Super. 1, 400 A.2d 485 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979)
(sleigh riding and ice skating); Trimblett v. State, 156 NJ. Super. 291, 383 A.2d 1146
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (boating); Odar v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 138 N.J. Super.
464, 351 A.2d 389 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), certif. denied, 70 N.J. 525, 361 A.2d 540 (1976)
(ice skating); McCord v. Ohio Div. of Parks & Recreation, 54 Ohio St. 2d 72,375 N.E.2d
50 (1978) (swimming); Crabtree v. Shultz, 57 Ohio App. 2d 33, 384 N.E.2d 1294 (1977)
(horseback riding); Denton v. L.W. Vail Co., 23 Or. App. 28, 541 P.2d 511 (1975) (motor-
cycle riding); Bilbao v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 257 Or. 360, 479 P.2d 226 (1971) (pic-
nicking); McCarver v. Manson Park & Recreation Dist., 92 Wash. 2d 370, 597 P.2d 1362
(1979) (swimming and diving).
A few decisions have concluded that the activities were not "recreational". See, e.g.,
Shepard v. Wilson, 123 Ga. App. 74, 179 S.E.2d 550 (1971) (child injured near open fire);
Villanova v. American Fed'n of Musicians, Local 16, 123 N.J. Super. 57, 301 A.2d 467
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973) (concert musician tripped and fell in park).
Georgia Power Co. v. McGruder, 126 Ga. App. 562, 191 S.E.2d 305, rev'd on other
grounds, 229 Ga. 811, 194 S.E.2d 440 (1972), offered this definition:
actual knowledge of the owner that its property is being used for recreational
purposes; that a condition exists involving an unreasonable risk of death or
serious bodily harm; that the condition is not apparent to those using the prop-
erty; and that having this knowledge, the owner chose not to guard or warn, in
disregard of the possible consequences. This test excludes either constructive
knowledge or a duty to inspect.
Id. at 564, 191 S.E.2d at 307.
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"Wilful" or "wanton" misconduct is not defined by the
statutes. Judicial interpretation of these terms has generated much
confusion, since treatment of the exceptions has varied among
jurisdictions. Even within a particular state, inconsistent de-
cisions have arisen."" A few courts have interpreted these words to
mean "conscious or deliberate disregard" for the safety of the visi-
tor, requiring the landowner to have knowledge of a particularly
dangerous hazard. 86 Others do not follow as strict an approach 7
It is generally agreed that a landowner's knowledge of a con-
dition that poses a substantial risk to visitors should prevent him
from receiving statutory immunity. In Krevics v. Ayars,8 a land-
owner who had previously acquiesced in the use of part of his land
for a motorbike trail installed a cable across the bike path without
posting warning signs. A bike rider using the trail collided with the
almost invisible wire and sustained severe injuries. The court held
the landowner liable since he could reasonably have foreseen harm
to the motorcyclist.8 9
Numerous cases have concluded that arguably hidden objects
are not dangerous hazards. Several snowmobile accident cases con-
struing the gross negligence exception to landowner tort immunity
have turned on whether a snowmobiler using proper precautions
would be aware of the hazard. For instance, in Rock v. Concrete
Materials, Inc.,90 a case arising prior to New York's abrogation of
the entrant classifications, 91 a snowmobiler sustained serious in-
juries when his vehicle struck a gate on a private roadway.
85. Compare Lostritto v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140 Cal.
Rptr. 905 (1977) with English v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 224 (1977); Thomas v. Consumers Power Co., 394 Mich. 459, 231 N.W.2d 653 (1975)
with Thone v. Nicholson, 84 Mich. App. 538, 269 N.W.2d 665 (1978).
86. See, e.g., Krevics v. Ayars, 141 NJ. Super. 511, 358 A.2d 844 (Salem Co. Ct. Law
Div. 1976).
87. See, e.g., Rock v. Concrete Materials, Inc., 46 A.D.2d 300, 362 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1974),
appeal dismissed, 36 N.Y.2d 772, 329 N.E.2d 672, 368 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1975).
88. 141 N.J. Super. 511, 358 A.2d 844 (Salem Co. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
89. Id. at 515, 358 A.2d at 846. See also Stephens v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 998
(N.D. Ill. 1979). However, the simple act of stretching a wire cable across a roadway,
absent allegations of a "wilful or malicious failure to warn of the hazard" has been held
to entitle immunity under the statute. See Wirth v. Ehly, 287 Wis. 2d 433, 440, 287 N.W2d
140, 147 (1980).
90. 46 A.D.2d 300, 362 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1974), appeal dismissed, 36 N.Y.2d 772, 329
N.E.2d 672, 368 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). Accord, LaCarte v. New York Explosives Corp., 72
A.D.2d 873, 421 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1979) (snowmobile case).
91. The New York Court of Appeals abolished the three entrant categories in Basso
v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976). See generally text accom-
panying notes 6-11 supra.
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Although the gate had originally been designed to keep out tres-
passers, the defendant had cleared a path around it for use by
snowmobilers. The appellate division affirmed a directed verdict
for the landowner, rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the barri-
cade was a dangerous structure. The court determined that "the
gate was not hidden or concealed-except, if at all, by dark-
ness of night,"' 2 and reasoned that an ordinarily prudent snow-
mobiler should have discovered the gate.
Wight v. State of New York, 93 although arising after New York
abolished entrant classifications, reached the same conclusions as
Rock. The plaintiff-snowmobiler was injured when he mistook a
snow-covered dock for a snowdrift and attempted to cross it. The
court held the landowner's duty was limited to warning the visitor
"of traps or dangerous defects not likely to be discovered," 94 and
noted that the plaintiff knew of the dock's existence because he
had been snowmobiling "within 300 feet of the dock one week
before the accident." 9 5 Furthermore, the landowner could not have
anticipated the plaintiff's careless operation of the vehicle during a
blizzard in which visibility was severely impaired.96
While it appears that the courts in the above mentioned
"snowmobiler" cases have been protective of the landowner, courts
in "swimming and diving" cases generally appear to be protective
of the injured plaintiffs.9 For example, in Lostritto v. Southern
Pac. Transp. Co.,98 a sixteen-year-old boy dove off a railroad bridge,
fracturing his neck. The railroad trestle spanned the river near a
popular beach, and the defendant had been aware of the bridge's
use as a diving platform by area swimmers. The defendant failed to
post warning signs, even after learning of a drowning at the loca-
92. 46 A.D.2d at 303, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
93. 93 Misc. 2d 560, 403 N.Y.S.2d 450 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
94. Id. at 564, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
95. Id. at 565, 403 N.YS.2d at 453.
96. Id. "Boating and motorcycle" cases have been decided on similar grounds. In
Wright v. Alabama Power Co., 335 So.2d 322 (Ala. 1978), a boater crashed into a sub-
merged fence. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled for the defendant, noting that the fence
was out of the water much of the year so as to be sufficiently "open and obvious." Id. at
326. Similarly, in English v. Matin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal. App. 3d 725, 136 Cal. Rptr.
224 (1977), the court dismissed a suit of a motorcyclist who fell into a pit being excavated
to install a water tank. Similarly, in Thone v. Nicholson, 84 Mich. App. 538, 269 N.W.2d
665 (1978), the court dismissed the claim of a motorcyclist who struck the bank of a creek
near an abandoned railroad right-of-way.
97. But see Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514, 588 P.2d 1351 (1979).
98. 73 Cal. App. 3d 737, 140 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977).
1979]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tionY9 The California Appellate Court held there was a jury ques-
tion concerning wilful misconduct as a result of the defendant's
knowledge of the dangerous condition. °10 In Miller v. United
States,101 the defendant-operator of a federal wildlife refuge agreed
to the use of a boat dock for diving. The water was very shallow, and
the nineteen-year-old plaintiff dove off the dock without checking
the depth of the water. The youth incurred permanent injuries
when he hit his head on the bottom of the lake. The Illinois district
court held for the injured youth, stating that the defendant could
have discovered and, in fact, knew of the dangerous conditions at
the west end boat dock, but had done nothing to remedy them or
warn users against them. He wilfully failed to guard or warn against
a known dangerous condition.
10 2
Recent cases, however, have refuted the rationale of Miller
and have applied the statutory tort immunity to swimming acci-
dents. In McCarver v. Manson Park and Recreation Dist.,03 the
Washington Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a wrongful
death action resulting from the death of a fourteen-year-old who
struck her head while swimming in an area of a public park
possessed and controlled by the defendant. The court rejected the
contention that there was a duty to supervise the area or provide
lifeguards °0 In Johnson v. Stryker Corp.,O° an Illinois appellate
court dismissed a similar action and stated that "[w]e cannot agree
with the dicta of the court in Miller v. United States . . . that
liability exists where by the exercise of reasonable care the
existence of such dangerous conditions could have been discovered
and become known."108
Instead of following the Miller approach, it may be more
appropriate to balance the reasonableness of the landowner's
protective efforts against the foreseeability of harm to the user of
99. Addressing the question of a landowner's duty to post swimming areas, one court
suggested that the type of land might determine the extent of warning required. Piggot v.
United States, 480 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1973). Piggot distinguished between a "public swim-
ming beach," requiring a warning of offshore hazards, and an "esthetic" beach, for which
no lifeguard or other protection is necessary. Id. at 141.
100. 73 Cal. App. 3d at 745, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
101. 442 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. 111. 1976), aft'd, 597 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1979).
102. 442 F. Supp. at 561-62.
103. 92 Wash. 2d 370, 597 P.2d 1362 (1979).
104. Id. at 371,597 P.2d at 1363.
105. 70 Il. App. 3d 717, 388 N.E.2d 932 (1979).
106. Id. at 722, 388 N.E.2d at 935 (citations omitted).
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the land. 07 This is not to suggest that courts should permit land-
owner immunity in cases of deliberate imposition of risks, 08 but
rather that landowners or occupiers should be liable only if a
known hazardous, hidden and unavoidable risk is not remedied.
Such hazards could either be removed or posted with warning
signs, depending on cost and feasibility. This test would be more
consistent with the statutory intent to increase the availability of
private land by providing tort immunity, while adequately protect-
ing recreational users of land.
D. Implied Exception for Infant Plaintiffs
The welfare of children presents greater concern, and results
in a finding of a higher duty of care. The common law "attractive
nuisance" doctrine'019 is often invoked to deny landowner im-
munity. In these cases, courts have held defendants liable by finding
wilful misconduct," 0 creating an "infant exception" to the
statute,"' or simply ignoring the statute altogether."2
The importance of society's interest in the safety of children
appears to. outweigh any policy favoring unrestricted land, use. In
O'Connell v. Forest Hill Field Club,"3 a New Jersey appellate
court deduced that "nothing in the legislative history of the act
... [shows] . . .that the Legislature intended it to apply to an
infant trespasser. The most likely interpretation that could be
107. See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947). See also Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514, 588 P.2d 1351 (1979)
(balancing risks and harms against recreational benefits); R. POSNER, supra note 19, § 6.7 at
128-31.
108. See, e.g., Krevics v. Ayars, 141 NJ. Super. 511, 358 A.2d 844 (Salem Co. Ct. Law
Div. 1976).
109. This doctrine is typically applied only to infant children. See W. PROSSER, LAw
OF TORTS § 59 at 365 (4th ed. 1971). A typical example of an attractive nuisance is danger-
ous machinery without appropriate safeguards. See, e.g., Washington v. Trend Mills, Inc.,
121 Ga. App. 659, 175 S.E.2d 111 (1970) (child playing baseball became caught in un-
guarded conveyor belt outside factory as he tried to retrieve baseball). See also Gerchberg
v. Loney, 223 Kan. 446, 576 P.2d 593 (1978) (child injured by unattended smoldering fire
in trash barrel incinerator).
110. See, e.g., Magerowski v. Standard Oil Co., 274 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Mich. 1967);
Taylor v. Mathews, 40 Mich. App. 74, 198 N.W.2d 843 (1972).
111. See, e.g., O'Connell v. Forest Hill Field Club, 119 NJ. Super. 317, 291 A.2d 386
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972). But see Magro v. City of Vineland, 148 N.J. Super. 34, 371
A.2d 815 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
112. See Mascarena v. Booth, 568 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1977); McWilliams v. Guzinski,
71 Wis. 2d 57,287 N.W.2d 437 (1976).
113. 119 N,, Sll.r r. 317,291 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
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placed on the act is that it was intended to protect the landowners
from liability to sportsmen who came upon their property." 1
The special protection provided to young children in O'Con-
nell was expanded by Scheck v. Houdaille Constr. Materials, Inc."
0
The Scheck court, relying extensively on O'Connell, held that the
legislature had not intended the recreational use statute to over-
rule a line of New Jersey cases entitling infants to a higher degree
of care from owners and occupiers than other entrants. 1 0 Scheck
examined the statute's legislative history, and noted that it ex-
panded the older measure which had limited immunity of rural
landowners to actions brought by injured hunters and fishermen. 1 7
The court then attempted to reconcile the expanded immunity
of the newer statute with the higher level of protection accorded
infants in New Jersey, and ultimately held for the infant plaintiff.
Declaring that a preliminary determination had to be made
whether the landowner immunity law was relevant to the case at
bar," the Scheck court concluded that the question of reasonable-
ness was one for the jury. Accordingly, summary judgment or
dismissal of the suit solely on the basis of the statute was
precluded."'
O'Connell and Scheck were not considered governing prece-
dents in Magro v. City of Vineland.120 The appellate court in
Magro, considering a factual situation similar to Scheck, affirmed
a summary judgment for the defendant-landowner. The Magro
court concluded, contrary to Scheck, that "[o]ur study of the
legislation and its history has failed to produce a single clue, direct
or circumstantial, whereby it can be inferred that the legislature
intended to exempt infant claimants from the statutory immunity.
The language of the statute is dear and unequivocal." 21 Magro,
however, has proven to be an exception. More recently, Harrison
114. Id. at 220, 291 A.2d at 388.
115. 121 NJ. Super. 335, 297 A.2d 17 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
116. The most frequently cited case is Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Corp.,
9 N.J. 38, 86 A.2d 777 (1952).
117. 121 N.J. Super. at 339, 297 A.2d at 19.
118. That determination was held to depend upon the "reasonableness of the expecta-
tion that a landholder would, without extraordinary effort, maintain a supervision of the
property." Id. at 242, 297 A.2d at 21.
119. Id. at 244, 297 A.2d at 22.
120. 148 N.J. Super. 24, 271 A.2d 815 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
121. Id. at 8, 371 A.2d at 818.
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i. Middlesex Water Co. 122 granted immunity to a landowner sued
for the drowning of several ice skaters. In dicta, however, the court
indicated acceptance of the line of cases finding an exception in
favor of very young children.'2 Harrison also accepted the validity
of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine in New Jersey. In general,
the New Jersey cases contain ambiguities and inconsistencies which
cloud the standards governing a landowner's liability to infants
"playing" on his property.
In several infant plaintiff cases, courts have simply ignored the
recreational use statutes.124 Other state courts have held the owner
liable for injuries to young children, by applying an "inherently
dangerous" standard. For example, in McWilliams v. Guzinski,-25
the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared that "an insufficiently
guarded swimming pool maintained in a residential area may be
inherently dangerous to a child four years of age." ' 26 The dissent
argued, however, that under Wisconsin case law, the recreational
liability statute should have been sufficient to dismiss the com-
plaint.127
Not all courts have given child plaintiffs special treatment.
Some unequivocally deny that the landowner statutes impart special
status to youngsters. 28 For example, some courts rely upon the
distinction between natural and artificial land conditions, regard-
less of the plaintiff's age. 29 In Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle,
30
two children drowned in a six-foot deep pond located "in an
unimproved brushy terrain a few hundred yards from [a] housing
development." '' The Washington Supreme Court rejected the
122. 158 N.J. Super. 368, 386 A.2d 405 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 80 NJ. 391, 403 A.2d 910 (1979).
123. 158 N.J. Super. at 382-83 n.2, 386 A.2d at 412 n.2.
124. See, e.g., Oliver v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. App. 790, 250 S.E.2d 519 (1978) (re-
lying on a trespassor/invitee analysis). See also Leone v. City of Utica, 66 A.D.2d 463, 414
N.Y.S.2d 412 (1979).
125. 71 Wis. 2d 57, 237 N.W.2d 437 (1976).
126. Id. at 62, 237 N.W.2d at 439. Compare McWilliams v. Guzinski with Boileau v.
De Cecco, 125 N.J. Super. 263, 310 A.2d 497 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), in which a similar
result was reached. The .Boileau court, however, acknowledged the existence of the land-
owner liability statute.
127. 71 Wis. 2d at 75-76 & nn.2--27, 237 N.W.2d at 445-46 & nn.23-27 (citing Good-
son v. Racine, 61 Wis. 2d 554,213 N.W.2d 16 (1973)).
128. In Blair v. United States, 433 F. Supp. 217 (D. Nev. 1977), the court stated that
"nothing in the statute itself indicates that a special duty owed to children cuts across its
clear meaning." Id. at 218.
129. See, e.g., Loney v. McPhillips, 268 Or. 378, 521 P.2d 340 (1974).
130. 91 Wash. 2d 514,588 P.2d 1351 (1979).
131. Id. at 516,588 P.2d at 1353.
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plaintiff's attractive nuisance claim and cited the Washington Land-
owner Liability Statute 32 as an alternative ground for its holding.18
It concluded that the risks to children would not be alleviated if
liability were imposed.
The cost to the [landowner] of filling the pond in this case demon-
strates the heavy burden which the duty of removing such natural
hazards would place on the landowner. And at the same time the
neighborhood has lost a recreational amenity which apparently
was enjoyed by both adults and children. The danger of drowning
has not been removed, as there is a creek and a very large lake
[nearby].13 4
In summary, the law regarding special protection for youthful
claimants sustaining recreational injuries remains unsettled. Per-
haps the best solution would be to evaluate all of these claims under
the "wilful and wanton misconduct" exception to statutory im-
munity.13 5 The age of the plaintiff would then be only one factor
to be considered, along with the nature and remoteness of the
terrain, the lack of parental supervision, and the general hazard of
the activity.
II. APPLICABILITY OF RECREATIONAL TORT IMMUNITY TO
MUNICIPAL, STATE OR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS
Courts have inconsistently decided whether the immunity
available to private landowners extends to cities, counties, states,
or agencies of a governmental unit. Several state courts have denied
governmental units the benefits of the statutory immunity,1 0
resting largely on a conclusion that extending immunity to such
defendants would not increase access to private lands.s 7
132. WAsH. R v. CODE § 4.24.210 (Supp. 1979).
133. The court focused primarily on the attractive nuisance theory, finding it to be
inapplicable to a naturally formed body of water. 91 Wash. 2d at 516 & n.1, 588 P.2d at
1353 & n.l.
134. Id. at 521, 588 P.2d at 1356.
135. See text accompanying notes 82-108 supra.
136. When the statutes are applicable to municipal or governmental landowners,
courts have generally found no duty to warn. It is perceived that such a duty would restrict
the opening of lands for recreation. See, e.g., Gard v. United States, 594 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir.
1979); Smith v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Wyo. 1974), af'd, 548 F.2d 872 (10th
Cir. 1976); Ochampaugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514, 588 P.2d 1351 (1979).
137. See, e.g., Cords v. Ehly, 62 Wis. 2d 31, 214 N.W.2d 432 (1974); Goodson v. City
of Racine, 61 Wis. 2d 554,213 N.W.2d 16 (1973).
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Goodson v. City of Racine'38 held that Wisconsin's limited
landowner tort liability statute did not extend to municipal cor-
porations. In Goodson, a visitor to a city park was injured when he
slipped into a trench adjacent to a parking lot. The city's demurrer,
based on the statute, was denied, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed. The supreme court concluded that "since municipalities
had previously and do presently encourage its citizenry to make
-use of its property, such an action on the part of the legislature to
encourage municipalities to allow use of its property would be
purposeless." 131 This result was legislatively overruled in 1975
when the statutory term "owner" was redefined to include "any
private citizen, a municipality, ... the state, or the U.S. Govern-
ment." 140
In Miller v. United States, 141 an Illinois federal district court
distinguished between private landowners who merely allow occa-
sional recreational use of their property, and governmental land-
owners who affirmatively undertake to provide recreational
facilities.
[T]he Recreational Use of Land and Water Areas Act is intended
for hose who permit open lands to be used recreationally on a
casual basis. But those who hold their property out to the public
for recreational purposes, and maintain their property for recrea-
tional use... are... not entitled to the asserted protection of
the [landowner statute]. 142
In Anderson v. Brown Bros.,45 the Michigan Court of Appeals
held that the landowner statute did not provide a defense for the
municipal landowner who was a co-defendant in the suit. The court
determined that the other co-defendant, a private landowner, was
also barred from relying on the statute as a defense: "A tenant or
lessee of lands owned by a municipality while engaged in a govern-
mental function enjoys no greater protection from the recreational
138. 61 Wis. 2d 554, 213 N.W.2d 16 (1973). A similar conclusion was reached in
Hahaii when counsel for the state conceded that the landowner liability statute did not
extend its immunity to the state government. Geremia v. State, 58 Haw. 502, 505 n.3, 573
P.2d 107, 110 n.3 (1977). Cf. McPhee v. Dade County, 362 So. 2d 74 (Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(Florida landowner statute does not apply to counties).
139. 61 Wis. 2d at 559, 213 N.W.2d at 19.
140. Act of Mar. 24, 1975, ch. 179, § 5, 1975 Wis. Laws 570.
141. 442 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd, 597 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1979). But see
Johnson v. Stryker Corp., 70 Ill. App. 3d 717, 388 N.E.2d 932 (1979) (criticizing Miller).
142. 442 F. Supp. at 561.
143. 65 Mich. App. 409, 237 N.W.2d 528 (1975).
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property immunity than that enjoyed by the municipality, which is
none."' 44 An anomoly is created in this situation whereby the
defendant corporation, if it had owned rather than leased the
property, would have enjoyed tort immunity under the Michigan
statute.
New Jersey has taken a contrary approach, suggesting that all
landowners are entitled to the benefits of the statute, regardless of
their public or private status. In Magro v. City of Vineland,"1 ,
a New Jersey appellate court distinguished a prior case 4 that had
suggested landowner statutes only applied to private rural areas.
It held that the defendant city was entitled to immunity under
the recreational use statute. Trimblett v. State147 supplied the
analysis absent in Magro. In Trimblett, several persons who rented
boats from a private marina were declared missing in a state
reservoir and presumed drowned. In the subsequent wrongful
death action against the state, the New Jersey court adopted an
approach contrary to that used by the Michigan court in Anderson:
"It would be an unreasonable construction of the respective statutes
to construe them as providing that the State or other public entity
would have a greater tort liability than a private landowner." 148
New Jersey courts have essentially followed Trimblett, but
recently have noted restrictions to the grant of immunity to
municipal defendants. These restrictions relate to the nature of the
activities of the plaintiff and the type of land on which the injury
occurred. For example, in Diodato v. Camden County Park
Comm'n,149 the court agreed that the statute should be liberally
construed to protect municipal defendants. However, the opinion
contained a caveat: "The statute clearly applies to the physical
condition of the premises itself, not to the superimposition of an
artificially created hazard thereon .... Since the injury producing
instrumentality in this case bears no relation to the natural
144. Id. at 419,237 N.W.2d at 532.
145. 148 N.J. Super. 34,3 71 A.2d 815 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
146. Odar v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 138 N.J. Super. 464, 351 A.2d 389 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1976).
147. 156 N.J. Super. 291, 383 A.2d 1146 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
148. Id. at 295, 383 A.2d at 1149. See also McCord v. Ohio Div. of Parks & Recreation,
54 Ohio St. 2d 72, 375 N.E.2d 50 (1978) (equating liability of state with that of a private
landowner).
149. 162 N.J. Super. 275,286, 892 A.2d 665,670.
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condition of the unimproved public property, [summary judgment
for the defendant is improper]." 110
The scope of municipal tort immunity in New Jersey was
further undercut in Primo v. City of Bridgeton.151 The Primo court
articulated a two-pronged test for state, county and municipal
tort immunity. First, there had to be a "rational connection"
between the injury-causing instrumentality, the premises, and the
activity. 5 2 Second, the injury-causing instrumentality must not be
"improved land" or land with an "artificial condition" on it.1
By automatically denying immunity whenever a municipal
landowner "improved" his land or constructed an "artificial" struc-
ture, Primo adopted an overly harsh and restrictive approach to
recreational tort immunity. It would be more reasonable to apply
the "gross negligence" exception to landowner immunity. In this
manner, the statutes would continue to foster gratuitous access to
recreational land while simultaneously protecting victims of "gross
negligence." This approach is illustrated by the recent decision of
the Washington Supreme Court in McCarver v. Manson Park &
Recreation Dist.,154 which provided immunity to municipalities
without the restrictions imposed in Diodato and Primo. In Mc-
Carver, the court noted that the statute "draws no distinctions
between public and private landowners, vis-a-vis the designated
recreational activities.""" The court rejected the argument that
immunity should not apply to areas used exclusively for recrea-
tional purposes.'
As a public landowner, the federal government is also entitled
to the defenses of the various immunity statutes. As the district
court stated in Smith v. United States:
5 7
150. Id. at 289, 392 A.2d at 672.
151. 162 N.J. Super. 394, 392 A.2d 1252 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). The court de-
termined that the city, which was financed by taxes, operated a park for a "municipal"
rather than a "philanthropic" purpose, and rejected the claim of immunity. Id. at 398-99,
392 A.2d at 1254-55.
152. Id. at 401-02, 392 A.2d at 1256.
153. Id. at 402, 392 A.2d at 1257.
154. 92 Wash. 2d 370, 597 P.2d 1362 (1979).
155. Id. at 373, 597 P.2d at 1365.
156. The same logic had been advanced successfully in Goodson v. City of Racine,
61 Wis. 2d 554, 213 N.W.2d 16 (1973), but was rejected in Trimblett v. State, 156 N.J.
Super. 291, 383 A.2d 1146 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
157. 383 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Wyo. 1974), aff'd, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976).
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The United States is not an insurer of the safety of visitors to
national parks .... [I]t would not be reasonable ... [to require
construction of] boardwalks, guardrails, barricades, fences, or signs
with respect to each and every thermal feature in the park, par-
ticularly when the danger of such thermal features is apparent,
obvious and notorious.158
It is noteworthy that in virtually every case positing liability
of the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act,1""
in which the issue of immunity under the state recreational liability
laws had been raised, the federal government has been held en-
titled to the statutory immunity.160 One reason for the deference
to the federal government in these cases may be fear that an increase
in tort liability may result in the curtailment of recreational activi-
ties on federal lands.'' In one case, Gard v. United States 0 2 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed the availability of tort
immunity for governmental defendants, and warned that the
government could "completely close various federal lands to public
use if it felt its potential tort liability was too great." 103
CONCLUSION
The recreational liability statutes represent a consensus among
the states that fear of tort liability will inhibit landowners from
permitting public use of private land for leisure activities. In this
way, these statutes provide an incentive for allowing gratuitous
access to land for recreation.
158. Id. at 1081. Other federal courts have followed the Smith approach in deciding
whether tort immunity should be granted to the federal government. See, e.g., Phillips v.
United States, 590 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1979); McClain v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 770
(D. Ore. 1978); Gard v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Cal. 1976); aff'd, 594 F.2d 1230
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 138 (1979); Hamilton v. United States, 371 F. Supp.
230 (ED. Va. 1974). See also Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1979)
(immunity denied on other grounds).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1976).
160. Miller v. United States, 442 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. 111. 1976), af'd, 597 F.2d 614 (7th
Cir. 1979), and Stephens v. United States, 472 F. Supp. 998 (C.D. Ill. 1979), appear to be
the only exceptions. However, both appear to have been based on an incorrcct interpreta-
tion of Illinois substantive law. See Johnson v. Stryker Corp., 70 Ill. App. ad 717, 888
N.E2d 932 (1979).
161. See, e.g., National Trails Systems Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1249 (1976);
Renewable Resources Extensions Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1676 (1978).
162. 594 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1979).
163. Id. at 1232. State courts have also acknowledged the possibility of retrenchment
by previously generous landowners. See, e.g., English v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 66 Cal.




While problems still exist,'" the statutes serve a useful purpose
without unduly burdening recreational entrants. Although it may
not be possible to verify that public access has been advanced by
these statutes, the overwhelming majority of state legislatures and
courts indicate that it has. Additionally, the statutes strike a
reasonable balance by apportioning risks between the landowner
and entrant. In circumstances where an extrahazardous condition
has not been corrected by the landowner, courts have held the
owner or occupier guilty of gross negligence. Similarly, reasoned
application of the consideration exception has prevented com-
mercial enterprises from taking undue advantage of these statutes.
The statutes, however, may be improved. States like New
York,' 5 for example, which have repeatedly amended the activities
covered by the statute, should follow the lead of New Jersey 6 '
and Wisconsin167 and include a clause encompassing general
recreational activities. Such a clause would better enable courts
to decide whether a non-enumerated activity is "recreational." The
statutes should specifically provide immunity to governmental
entities to encourage them to provide land for recreational use and
deter them from closing lands already open, as well as avoid
164. Increased mobility of recreational enthusiasts results in plaintiffs crossing state
lines. Trial courts could apply the internal law of the forum state, the law of the plaintiff's
residence, or the law of some other jurisdiction. Three examples of decisions that have
addressed the conflict of law questions in landowner immunity cases are Bilbao v. Pacific
Power 9- Light Co., 275 Or. 360, 479 P.2d 226 (1971), where the parties agreed to apply the
law of Washington, where the injury occurred; Orawsky v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co.,
472 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1977), interpreted Pennsylvania choice of law rules on the basis
of the diversity jurisdiction rule in Klaxon v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). Apply-
ing the "most significant relationship" test of Pennsylvania conflicts rules, the court con-
cluded that New Jersey substantive law had to be applied
since the liability asserted is based on the defendant's ownership of land in New
Jersey. A landowner should be able to rely on the law of the state where the land
is situated in determining what duty is owed to people using the land and what
measures should be taken to fulfill that duty.
472 F. Supp. at 883. Gard v. United States, 420 F. Supp. 300 (ND. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 594
F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 100 S.Ct. 138 (1979), also raised conflict of laws
issues. Several college students traveled from California to inspect an abandoned mine in
Nevada. The court labeled this activity "sightseeing," thus barring the plaintiff's suit under
the Nevada statute. 420 F. Supp. at 302.
165. NEw YoRK GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103 (McKinney Supp. 1979) has been repeatedly
amended. For example, the 1979 amendments added "cutting or gathering of wood for non-
commercial purposes" and "boating." The 1978 amendments had previously dded "hang-
gliding," "speleological activities" and "cross-country skiing." A pending bill would add
"skating." 1980 Ass. Bill No. 9464, Sen. Bill No. 8006.
166. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42A-2 (West Supp. 1979).
167. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 29.68 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979).
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subjecting them to an unequal burden of liability in cases involv-
ing multiple defendants.
The participants in outdoor sports should use prudence and
caution when entering unfamiliar terrain. The duty of care-
within reason-will properly rest on the recreational visitor who
is granted gratuitous access to the land.
MICHAEL S. BUSKUS
168. Courts have declined to order landowners to post billboard-like cautionary signs
warning of hazards to avoid liability. This is a reasonable approach since
rather than despoiling the natural quality of the land with signs pointing to
various hazardous conditions for the benefit of a public which many landowners
merely tolerate, landowners would find it would make much more sense to post
the land "no trespassing."
Thone v. Nicholson, 84 Mich. App. 538, 553, 269 N.W.2d 665, 672 (1978); accord, Ocham-
paugh v. City of Seattle, 91 Wash. 2d 514, 588 P.2d 1351 (1979).
